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Abstract—Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) consists of a
cloud-based infrastructure to offer consumers raw computation
resources such as storage and networking. These resources are
billed using a pay-per-use cost model. However, this type of
infrastructure is far from being a security haven as the seven
main threats defined by the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA)
indicate. Using logging systems can provide evidence to support
accountability for an IaaS cloud, which helps us mitigating
known threats. In this paper, we research to which extent such
logging systems help mitigate risks associated with the threats
identified by the CSA. A generic architecture ‘template’ for
logging systems is proposed. This template encompasses all
possible instantiations of logging solutions for IaaS cloud. We
map existing logging systems to our generic template, and
identify a logging solution to mitigate the risks associated with
CSA threat number one (related to spam activities). We then
argue that the template we suggest can be used to perform
a systematic analysis of logging systems in terms of security
before deploying them in production systems.
Keywords-IaaS; cloud monitoring; logging system;
I. INTRODUCTION
Many people argue that the cloud is the future of com-
puting, and has the potential to transform the IT industry
in a wide variety of application areas [1]. This includes
infrastructure as a service (IaaS) which is used by enterprise,
government, and academia, such as in medical experimen-
tation [2], [3]. IaaS provides a base on which to build
Platform as a Service (PaaS) or Software as a Service
(SaaS) offerings, as pointed out in [4], [5]. However, trust of
consumers in a cloud is extremely important for its continued
proliferation. Customers want to know how and where their
data and related logs are stored and who has access to
them. The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) has extensively
published on this topic, see for instance Security Guidance
for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud Computing report [4]
and Top Threats to Cloud Computing report [6]. The latter
document is used in this study, providing the basic threats for
which we identify logging-based accountability solutions.
Although by itself not sufficient to mitigate the risks
associated with the threats, a logging system is an im-
portant aspect of any accountability solution in the cloud,
as argued by many researchers [1], [7], [8], [9]. In this
paper, a logging system composes of logging processes and
log files. A logging process performs logging-related tasks,
whereas log files are used for storing contents produced by
the logging processes. Each logging process has its own
task(s). For example, a main task of a logging process
called Flogger [10] is intercepting file operations of a virtual
machine (VM) for the purposes of accountability in the
cloud. It manages to store such intercepted data as log files.
We argue that logging systems are a core component for
cloud monitoring/accountability, which can assist to mitigate
risks associated with CSA threats, as also argued by [6], [9].
Recent works [7], [8] give an outline of
accountability/monitoring-related solutions for the cloud.
These works involve the logging processes and the log
files that will be in the cloud machines. However, they do
not discuss where exactly they could be in the machines
(which involve visualization infrastructure and more than
one party), and who will manage them and why.
Other works that involve design and implementation of
the logging solutions which could be applied in the cloud in-
clude [11], [12], [9], [13]. These works focus on monitoring
and logging tasks. Ideally, a logging system can be analyzed
with respect to its features and achievable goals before
deployment. However, these authors do not give completed
concerns about the security analysis of their logging systems
themselves (which include the logging processes and the
log files) before deploying them to the real world IaaS.
We believe it is important to perform a security analysis of
the monitoring/logging systems themselves as will be fully
discussed in Section II-D. In order to assist satisfying this
concern, we propose a systematic approach to constructing
and analyzing the security of a logging system itself be-
fore deployment. We achieve our objectives by proposing
a generic template that encompasses all possible logging
solutions in IaaS to mitigate the risks associated with all
seven CSA threats.
We use the term template to indicate that we consider
the union of all possible logging architectures that could be
instantiated. In that sense, the template by itself is not meant
to be implemented, but offers the building blocks from which
one can choose to create an actual logging solution. As a
result, the template is considered as generic. Moreover, with
respect to faster system development, the template is flexible
and implementation independent, and obeys reuse-ability. It
could be a starting point of building accountability systems
to address lack of trust in an IaaS.
Summary of Contributions: This paper has the following
contributions. First, we propose a generic logging template
for IaaS and discuss how it can be used to mitigate the
Figure 1. The IaaS architecture.
risks associated with the CSA threats. We then identify how
existing logging solutions (in particular HP Flogger [10]) can
be mapped on the template for Flogger’s security analysis
purposes. Finally, in order to demonstrate how the template
can be used to systematically instantiate logging systems
to deal with the CSA threats, we design and implement a
logging system to mitigate risks associated with CSA threat
1, which refers to the use of cloud computing for e-mail
spamming and similar activities.
II. BACKGROUND
A. IaaS Architecture
This paper focuses on IaaS cloud. Its architecture is
composed of a provider and a customer side, see Fig. 1. The
provider side can be an organisation that offers consumer
side services as rent-able VMs/domUs (e.g., Amazon EC2).
The customer side can be a person or an organization that
can remotely access these domUs via Internet. Our version
of IaaS architecture is based on the Xen architecture. The
main components of a IaaS architecture are hw, hypervisor,
dom0, and a number of domUs (domU1,.., domUn). We use
’hw’ as a short for hardware, which works as a host of
a hypervisor, and all guest OSes (dom0 and domUs). It is
managed, maintained and owned by the provider who uses it
to store and process customers’ data. A hypervisor is a layer
of software running directly on hw and allows the hw to run
multiple guest OSes at the same time. It is an interface for
all hardware requests from the guest OSes.
Dom0 is a privileged domain guest OS that is launched by
the hypervisor during system boot. It directly accesses the
hw and manages domUs. A domU is an unprivileged domain
guest OS that runs on top of the hypervisor, but has no
direct access to the hw. It is a VM, a product that customers
can rent from a provider. Thus, it is virtually owned by a
customer, and operates independently in the system. How-
ever, a domU is actually launched and controlled by dom0.
The other IaaS architecture can be based on the layers of a
cloud as discussed in [4], [14], [5]. [14] argues that a cloud
composes of seven layers: facility, network, hardware, OS,
middleware, application, and the user. It also states that IaaS
composes of facility, network, hardware, and OS. However,
PaaS can always be built up by adding extra layers on top
of IaaS layers.
B. The Seven CSA Top Threats to Cloud Computing
The first is abuse and nefarious use of cloud computing.
For example, people with bad intentions can register legit-
imately to rent domUs, and later they engage in malicious
activities (e.g., spamming). The second is insecure appli-
cation programming interfaces (APIs) that are offered by
providers. Customers have to use the APIs to interact with
their rented domUs. If the APIs are insecure by design, they
can be the cause of security issues (e.g., confidentiality) of
customers’ data in such domUs. The next threat is malicious
insiders who usually have full privilege over dom0 in IaaS
environment. Thus, they may exploit customers’ confidential
data in domUs. The forth is shared technology vulnerabili-
ties. For example, an owner of domU may gain unauthorized
access to the data of other domUs. The fifth threat is data
loss or leakage. Customers’ data loss may occurred due
to deletion of records without a backup of the original
data in domUs. The following one is account, service and
traffic hijacking. Attackers reuse customers’ credentials and
passwords, which can be stolen through phishing and fraud.
Thus, they can spy on customers’ activities in domUs. The
last threat is unknown risk profile. It is a fact that a customer
does not know about important information (such as who
is sharing her infrastructure) that can be used to predict
possible security risks of her domU. As a result, these threats
can be the cause of a lack of trust from the customers’ points
of view. Hence, we intend to study how accountability,
monitoring, and logging approaches could assist to address
these threats as discussed in the next section.
C. Accountability, Monitoring, and Logging in the IaaS
Enhancing accountability is necessary in order to mitigate
the risks associated with all CSA threats, and thus enable
customers to securely and confidently adopt IaaS. One im-
portant mechanism for accountability is monitoring, which
deploys a logging system as its core. Accountability in IaaS
roots on a similar concept with Accountable Cloud (AC)
in [8]. AC is the cloud that (i) the consumers can investigate
whether the provider is processing their data according to
the agreement, (ii) if errors are reported, the provider can
provide the evidence to verify who is responsible for the
problem, and (iii) if there is an argument, the provider can
present a proof to the third party. Therefore, AC could be a
very good concept to deal with the CSA threats in IaaS.
1) Monitoring as a Solution to the CSA Threats: In [6],
CSA states that a monitoring approach is one of the remedia-
tions in its list of solutions for each threat. It also argues that
monitoring can mitigate threats 1, 3, 4, 6, and 7. In [9], HP
also summarizes that some sort of log files (such as histories
of file access on the provider side) can aid the providers and
the consumers to mitigate CSA threats 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7.
2) Monitoring and its Components in IaaS: This paper
considers a monitoring system to be a system that can
monitor which activities take place inside dom0 and/or
domUs, and its main subsystem is a logging system. The
basic idea of a logging system is to use logging processes
to record particular information, such as in [12] the logging
processes record incoming and outgoing network packets of
domUs. Then they store such information as log files to be
used on particular purposes such as evidence for identifying
malicious network traffic in the domUs. This paper did not
discuss real-time elements of monitoring such as triggers.
It is because these elements should be fundamental for
monitoring system, and should always be considered and
implemented before deploying the system. We rather focus
on the security analysis of logging processes and log files,
which are critical components in a logging system.
There is some work outlining the components of monitor-
ing mechanisms. First, Chow et al. [7] introduced a trusted
monitor, which is installed in a cloud server, and produces a
proof of compliance for the data owner. This compliance can
be used to indicate that the data has not been manipulated
against the access policies. Second, Haeberlen [8] introduces
an accountable cloud (AC) to mitigate losing control of
the consumer data in the cloud. This work outlines a set
of building blocks of AC. One of the essential blocks is
tamper-evident logs which are all inputs and outputs of cloud
machines in the provider side. Both works have the same two
important components which are logging processes and log
files. For example: in [7], the trusted monitor is indeed as
logging processes that produce the compliance (as log files);
and in [8], the tamper-evidence logs is log files that could
be eventually produced by a logger (as logging processes).
These works only give the outline of the logging processes
and the log files that will be in the cloud machines. They
did not discuss a set of security relevant questions such
as where the log files and logging processes could be in
a IaaS architecture, should they run or be stored in the hw,
hypervisor, dom0, or domU, and who will manage them and
why. Hence, this paper considers the logging processes and
the log files as critical components in our proposed template,
in Section III. It also focuses on where precisely the logging
processes and log files can be inside the IaaS architecture.
It is because the locations of these components in the IaaS
can answer such questions above, which can directly and
significantly affect security concerns of these components as
will be fully discussed in Section II-D. This is our motivation
to study and to propose a generic logging template to
enhance the security of accountability/monitoring in IaaS.
D. Security Analysis of Logging Systems in an IaaS
The security analysis of logging systems themselves is
very important because the logging processes and log files
are critical components and so they need to satisfy a set
of security properties (e.g., integrity and privacy). Hence,
without the security analysis of logging systems, it could
be difficult to effectively and efficiently build and deploy
logging systems that can satisfy those security properties. A
Figure 2. The overall view of a generic logging template and its
components (logging process:Px, and log files:Fy).
IaaS environment, which involves virtualisation and more
than one party, makes the security analysis of logging
systems more complicated than ones within a private orga-
nization. Haeberlen [8] pointed out that one of the research
challenges of the Accountable Cloud is that it needs to have
mechanisms to allow legacy users to access the logging ma-
chine (which deploys logging processes) but not to maintain
the log files. Crosby and Wallach [15] agreed that ensuring
the integrity of the log files is a critical part of a larger
system. Therefore, it can be difficult to avoid the security
analysis of logging systems themselves before deployment.
Hence, this paper considers the security analysis of logging
systems as a significant criterion to establish the goals of
the template as will be discussed in the next section.
III. A GENERIC LOGGING TEMPLATE
This generic logging template is a generalisation of pre-
vious research work concerned with logging systems (in the
related work section) and how they fit together with the
components of a IaaS architecture. We investigate logging
process and log file components of each work. Then we
locate these components into the IaaS architecture. To deal
with the CSA threats as discussed in Section II-B, the first
goal of the template is that it can be used to instantiate new
logging system architecture to mitigate the risks associated
with all CSA threats in IaaS environment. Moreover, it is
as stated earlier in Section II-D that the security analysis
of logging systems is critical before they are deployed into
the real world IaaS. Hence, the second goal is that the
security of the newly built logging system architecture, that
is based on the template, can be systematically analyzed
before deployment.
A. The Details of the Template and its Components
The template and its components are presented in Fig. 2
and Table I-III. All defined components can be divided into
three sets. The first one is the IaaS set of components (all
white boxes) which are derived from the IaaS architecture
(Fig. 1). This set of components includes hw0, hypervisor,
Table I
THE IAAS SET OF COMPONENTS (ALL THE WHITE BOXES)
Component Description/Functions Examples Locations in IaaS environment
hw0 the hw described in Section II-A, it is managed and owned
by a provider/dom0, and consists of a disk0 and mem0
a PC/server in the provider side infrastructure
disk0 a physical disk of the hw0, it is managed by dom0 server’s disks physically in hw0
mem0 a main memory of the hw0 server’s main memory physically in hw0
hypervisor described in Section II-A, it concurrently runs a dom0 and
domUs
Xen on top of hw0
dom0 described in Section II-A, it consists of app0 a Fedora 16 dom0 on top of the hypervisor
app0 an application that runs inside dom0 by a provider a logging-related applica-
tion
in dom0 user level
domU described in Section II-A, it consists of appU, hwU a Fedora 16 domU on top of the hypervisor
appU an application that runs inside domU by an owner of domU mail application (a mail
command in Linux sys-
tem)
in domU user level
hwU virtual hardware that consists of diskU and memU - virtually in domU (hwU is physically in hw0; however,
we virtually locate it in the domU kernel level)
diskU a virtual disk of domU - virtually in hwU, and physically in disk0/hw0
memU a virtual main memory of domU - virtually in hwU, and physically in mem0/hw0
Table II
THE LOGGING PROCESS SET OF COMPONENTS (SHADED BOXES)
Component Description Examples/Functions Locations in IaaS
environment
P1
1) a dom0 user level process in PASSXen [11]: Waldo (to read provenance record from the log, store them in a database,
index them, and access the database for querying); or Coordinator-like (to periodically
consume temporary logs from mem0, and perform other tasks by communicating with other
dom0 kernel level Px or dom0 user level Px)
in dom0 user
level
or
2) special dom0 libraries for
logging purposes
libVMI [16] (to be called, for example, by app0 to read memU for introspection purposes)
P2 a dom0 kernel level process in HP Floggers System [10]: Flogger (to intercept dom0 file and network operations, then
store such intercepted data into disk0); or in PASSXen [11]: Analyzer (to process the
provenance records)
in dom0 kernel
level
P3 a domU kernel level process in HP Floggers System [10]: Flogger (to intercept domU file and network operations, then
it could temporarily store such intercepted data into diskU in case the data are too big to
be stored in memU); or in PASSXen [11]: Interceptor in domU (to intercept domU system
calls, and temporarily store such intercepted records in a mem0)
in domU kernel
level
P4 a process inside a hypervisor in AVMs system [12]: Logger (to record information about incoming and outgoing network
packets of domU)
in a hypervisor
Table III
THE LOG FILE SET OF COMPONENTS (SHADED BOXES)
Component Description Examples/Functions Locations in IaaS
environment
F1 temporary log data in diskU in Floggers System [10]: a domU HP Flogger (interceptor/P3) could temporarily stores the
domU intercepted data as F1 in diskU (in case the data are too big to be stored in memU)
for further processing
in diskU
F2 temporary log data in memU in HP Floggers System [10]: as same as the example of F1, but Flogger/P3 could eventually
and temporarily store the log data as F2 in memU for further processing
in memU
F3 permanent log data in disk0 in HP Floggers System [10]: Flogger/P2 can permanently store the intercepted data (as F3)
in disk0; or in AVMs system [12]: a Logger (P4) permanently stores the domU intercepted
network data (as F3) in disk0
in disk0
F4 temporary log data in mem0 in PASSXen [11]: domU Interceptor (P3) stores intercepted domU system calls data (as F4)
in mem0
in mem0
hwU, dom0, domU, app0, appU, disk0, diskU, mem0, and
memU. Table I explains description, functions, examples,
and locations in the IaaS environment of each component.
The next ones are the logging process set and the log file
set of components (shaded boxes) which can be created and
then located into the first set. They are the keys of the
template. In Table II, the logging process set composes of
logging processes (Px, x=1,...,4). We place only one Px in
particular locations as a representative of multiple Px in each
location. Hence, it is possible to have more than one Px in
a particular location such as it could be P2-4 in a dom0
kernel level, depending on design and implementation of
the actual logging systems. Any Px can collaborate with
another or others to achieve logging tasks. The log file set,
in Table III, composes of Fy (y=1,...,4). The representative
approach of Px can apply to Fy as well. Thus, it is possible
to have F1-F3 in disk0. Table II and III present description,
examples, functions, and, locations in the IaaS environment
of each component in both sets.
B. Discussion of Locations of Px and Fy in the Template
Px can have different functions and can be deployed in
different locations in the IaaS layers when dealing with
different CSA threats. Fig. 2 and Table I - III show that
there are four locations for Px. It can be in dom0 user
level (P1), dom0 kernel level (P2), domU kernel level (P3),
or hypervisor (P4). There are also four locations for Fy.
It can be a temporary Fy, which is temporarily stored in
either diskU (F1), memU (F2), or mem0 (F4) and can be
a permanent Fy, which is stored in diskU (F3). Locations
of Px and Fy can be used as their security indicators
(e.g., privacy of Fy) as stated in Section II-C2 and II-D,
and as will be demonstrated and discussed in the case
studies, in Section III-B. We consider mem0 and memU as a
component of the template because log data will eventually
and temporarily be in these memory, which affects the
security analysis of such log data. There are no Px and Fy
located in domU user (without root privileges) level, and Fy
could not be permanently stored in diskU. It is because they
could be easily disabled by the owner of domU which will
undesirably stop logging tasks as also argued by [10].
C. A Case Study of Mapping HP Flogger on the Template
As stated earlier in Section III-A, a logging system has
more than one Px in a particular location, depending on
its design and implementation. The Flogger system [10]
actually consists of more than one Px in its dom0 and domU
kernels. The template is generalized from related work in
Section V. Therefore, one can map any logging systems
in the related work section on the template. It is because
that HP Flogger is one of the related works; therefore, it is
easily mapped back on the template as shown in Fig. 3.
We assume this mapping is for the purposes of security
analysis of the logging system itself. However, the figure
Figure 3. Mapping some HP Flogger Px and Fx on the template.
Figure 4. The logging system architecture to mitigate the risks associated
with threat 1.
shows only mapping of some main components (P2-3 and
F3), which their examples/functions are already discussed in
Table II and III. After mapping the Flogger, one can analyze
security of this system based on the provided mapping, such
as how to ensure the integrity of F3 that is stored in disk0
which is fully owned and controlled by a provider. Hence,
all the related work in Section V can be mapped back on
the template; and their security can be analyzed.
D. A Case Study of an Identification of the Appropriate
Logging System Based on the Template to Mitigate the Risks
Associated with CSA Threat 1
In order to satisfy the goals of the template, this case
study demonstrates how to use the template to instantiate
the logging system architecture, and how to analyze the
security of this new built architecture. This case study, see
Fig. 4, simulates spam activities by assuming that spammers
rent a Linux VM/domU from an IaaS provider. They then
use appU (the mail command) to send a spam email to
a victim (see Fig. 5). The command (c1) used as spam
activities is: mail -s spamSubj winai.wongthai@ncl.ac.uk.
The mail command in c1 has three arguments. They are ag1
(-s), ag2 (spamSubj), and ag3 (winai.wongthai@ncl.ac.uk).
Thus, it sends the string ’spamSubj’ as an e-mail subject to
the email address ’winai.wongthai@ncl.ac.uk’. The case
Figure 5. Spam activities performed by appU (mail command) in domU.
Figure 6. LA in dom0 extracts c1’s ag2-3 as evidence for identifying
spam activities.
study’s goal is to capture c1’s ag2-3, and then write them
to a database as the log files. These log files can be used
by an auditor, a Trusted Third Party, or a provider as the
evidence to identify spam activities in this rented domU
later. We assume that ag2-3 is sufficient to identify these
spam activities.
1) Design and Implementation of the Logging System:
This logging system architecture is designed and based on
the template. Thus, we can choose some components from
the template (Fig. 2 and Table I-III) to build up the logging
system. At the time of the experiment, we found libVMI [16]
as the only available tool that can achieve the goal of the
case study. It is an introspection library to read memory
from VMs/domUs. We deployed libVMI as P1 (in dom0 user
level) to read memU of this spamming domU. Therefore, we
reuse libVMI as P1, then we choose F3 as log files to build
the logging system architecture. As a result, Fig. 4 shows the
overview of the newly designed logging system architecture
according to this case study’s goal. It is quite clear that the
new architecture composes of only P1 (libVMI), F3 (log
files), and app0 (the Logging Application: LA).
2) The Result of This Case Study: We run the process-list
command (the LA) inside dom0 (the first line in Fig. 6). It
keeps checking memU until c1 is performed. When c1 is
performed as shown in Fig. 5, then LA extracts c1’s ag2-
3 (Fig. 6, the second and third lines from the bottom)
then writes them to F3. The result in Fig. 5 and 6 shows
that we can use an application (e.g., LA), in dom0 to
capture information in memU or in the memory space of
any process, or commands of appU (such as c1) in domU.
We now have an appropriate logging system to mitigate the
risks associated with CSA threat 1. However, this system is
in the IaaS which involves at least two parties (provider and
customer). Hence, the system’s security needs to be analyzed
before deployment as described in the next section.
3) Analyzing the Security of our Logging System: Ideally,
these analyses needs to be completed before deploying our
logging system. We can directly use the logging system
architecture, Fig. 4, as a tool for our analyses. According
to Fig. 4, to achieve the security analysis of the logging
system this security relevant question need to be answered.
The question is: where the F3 will be located. From the
architecture, it will be located in disk0. Our discussion is
limited to only this question as an example of this analyzing.
The security analysis of the logging system directly involves
the answer above. One can analyze the privacy of F3
because it is in disk0, which is a part of hw0/dom0 (as
described in Table I) and is physically owned by a provider.
Therefore, the provider may maliciously learn about, or alter
F3, which is a privacy violation to a customer. Rocha and
Correia [17] demonstrate how this kind of attack can obtain
confidential data from a customer domU. This issue needs
to be addressed before deploying F3. However, the solution
for this issue is out of the scope of this paper.
E. To Detect Other Forms of Mis-behaviours of Threat 1
It is possible to detect some other forms of attacks
enclosed in threat 1 such as domUs that host downloads
for illegal software as stated in the CSA report [6]. This
can be achieved by detecting the process that downloads an
unacceptable certain amount of incoming network package.
It is possible to detect the downloading process’s mis-
behaviours as we do with the spam process. Although
dealing with all possible forms of threat 1 needs more
research, this case study shows that it is possible to detect
process’s mis-behaviours and then record them as log files
to be used as evidence to identify malicious use of domUs.
IV. EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
A. Evaluation of the Template
The template’s goals were already discussed in the begin-
ning of Section III. We evaluate the template against these
goals, and also provides many discussions of the template
(in Section IV-B, IV-C, IV-D), which affect many aspects
of logging systems in IaaS, as well as PaaS. To satisfy
the first goal, we demonstrate how to instantiate a logging
system to mitigate the risks associated with CSA threat 1
in Section III-D1, III-D2, and III-E. This is an example of
how the template can be used to instantiate logging systems
that are capable of mitigating risks associated with all CSA
threats. To satisfy the second goal, we discussed how to
analyze the security of the new designed logging system
architecture in the same case study in Section III-D3. Then
we found out this logging system’s privacy issues that need
to be addressed before deployment.
We also consider the the template as ‘generic’ because
of these considerations. 1) Ones can choose the components
(especially Px and Fy) from the template to instantiate their
new logging systems architecture. 2) Then, the security of
the new logging systems can be analyzed before deployment
using the systems’ architecture (from 1) as a tool. 3)
Thus, any logging system that deals with any CSA threat
will follow step 1-2 as same as we did in the spamming
case study. 4) The security of any existing logging system
in IaaS can be mapped on the template, then the system’s
security can be analyzed before deployment as discussed in
Section III-C.
B. Discussion of the Template
1) Any Other Locations of Px and Fy in the Template?:
We identify and describe all possible and important locations
of Px and Fy of the template in the IaaS as mainly discussed
in Section III-B. However, basic understanding of logging
systems and the template in the Xen-based IaaS layers could
apply to more complicated-based layers such as the layers
discussed in [4], [14]. These complicated-based layers can
indicate new locations of Px and Fy apart from the locations
which are presented in our template.
2) Traditional Log Files Versus Fy in the Template: This
template shows the possible logical and physical locations
of Fy. These locations can affect many security concerns
of logging systems as discussed in Section III-B and III-D3.
We did not propose a new approach to enhance fundamental
properties of log files (e.g., non-repudiation or tamper evi-
dent). There is research such as [15] that outline or propose
these properties (which can be applied to implementation of
Fy). For example, to deal with the tamper evident property,
Fy can be implemented by reusing existing logging file
systems such as the research done by Crosby and Wallach,
which introduces the semantics of tamper-evident logs using
a tree-based data structure [15]. Therefore, it could be
possible to efficiently reuse existing Fy when building a
new logging system, instead of building a whole new log
file system. This should make a logging system reliable,
its security analyzable, and its development and deployment
faster, flexible, rapidly adaptable in the IaaS real world.
C. How Does the Template Also Facilitates Analyzing of the
Security of Logging Processes (Px)
We already discussed how the template facilitates the
security analysis of Fy in Section III-D3. We also argue
that the security of a logging process itself (such as P1 in
the spamming case study, Fig. 4) has to be systematically
analyzed before deployment as well. For example from
Fig. 4, the simple security relevant question is how can
customers ensure the integrity of P1, which is run by the
provider in dom0’s user level. Locating P1 in dom0’s user
level is a security risk because the providers/insiders may
maliciously modify P1’s code to produce contents of log
files (F3) which benefit themselves.
D. The Other Possible Advantages of the Template
1) Performance Analysis of Logging Systems Which are
Based on the Template: This paper presents only example
of how to analyze the security of a new logging architecture
itself before deployment, in Section III-D3. However, in the
complex environment IaaS, performance of the new built
logging system could also be a critical factor that needs to be
thoroughly analyzed before deployment. For example, from
the template (Fig. 2), the performance of a logging system
that deploys P2 in dom0 kernel, and of one that deploys
P3 in domU kernel, should be different and needs to be
considered before deployment. With the locations of Px in
the newly built logging system architecture, made clear by
using the template, the system’s performance analysis could
be feasible. We believe that the template may be seen as
a preliminary study to really achieve a complete analyzing
of the newly built logging systems, based on all possible
aspects, such as security and performance.
2) Flexibility and Reuse-ability of Development of the
Log Files (Fy) and the Logging Processes (Px): We argue
that Fy can be implemented by reusing existing log files as
partly discussed in Section IV-B2. Fy can also be imple-
mented and based on provenance concepts which become
increasingly important as discussed in [18]. We already
demonstrated reusing available logging processes (libVMI)
as P1 that assists building the logging system in the case
study, Section III-D1. This is possible because the template
is implementation independent. Moreover, it presents the
logical and physical locations of Px and Fy in the IaaS
structure which one can choose these components to build
up their own logging system architecture. These flexibility
and reuse-ability enable the development of logging systems
faster, and more adjustable as will be fully discussed in the
next section. Thus, we are always ready to deal with new
emerging threats in the real world IaaS.
3) The Template Facilitates Faster Logging System De-
velopment With Security Concerns: There is some work
focusing on to implement Fy such as [15] as discussed in
Section IV-B2. Moreover, other works also focus on imple-
mentation of Px such as all that are discussed in the related
work section. This paper did not focus on creating a new
Px and/or Fy. We encourage ones to build a logging system
by following these two steps. 1) The design phase, they
can instantiate a logging system architecture by choosing
the appropriate Px and Fy (from the template), which fit
their needs. 2) The implementation phase, they can reuse the
existing Px and/or Fy systems (if any) that fit the designed
architecture in 1). Thus, we argue that one can build her
own logging systems based on the template with the secu-
rity concerns of the systems themselves and reuse-ability.
However, it is also possible to create her own versions of
logging systems without reusing, but the systems can be still
based on the template as well. As result, all participating
parties can analyze how critical components (Px and Fy), of
a newly built system, are distributed in the IaaS visualization
environment, which affects the security of this system.
4) Applying the Template to Mitigate Risks Associated
with CSA Threats for PaaS: Although this paper focuses
on dealing with the CSA threats to IaaS, these threats are
for the security of PaaS and SaaS as well [6]. PaaS can
always be built up by adding extra layers on top of IaaS
layers as discussed in the end of Section II-A. Therefore,
comprehension of our proposed template and of logging
systems in IaaS could also assist to mitigate risks associated
with the CSA threats applicable to the security of PaaS. For
example, it is possible that ones can add the extra layers
(e.g., in [4], Integration&Middleware layer can be added
on top of IaaS to build up PaaS) on top of our proposed
template to build up the template for PaaS. Then they can
considerer the possible and appropriate locations of Px and
Fy in this new PaaS template. These new locations of Px and
Fy in PaaS architecture could affect their security concerns
as same as we discussed our template for IaaS in this paper.
V. RELATED WORK
TrustCloud [9] is a framework proposed by HP to address
the lack of trust in the cloud. Its most important layer is the
system layer. It is a foundation to build other layers, and
deploys Flogger [10] as its core. Flogger is an interceptor
that can be placed in dom0 kernel or domU kernel to inter-
cept file and network operations of that domain. Haeberlen
et al. proposed Accountable Virtual Machines (AVMs) [12]
that detect mis-behaviors of online gaming servers by using
a modified hypervisor (VMware) to record all messages sent
and received by an untrusted server. The main process of this
work is a logger that is in the hypervisor to record incoming
and outgoing network packets of domUs. PASSXen [11] is
an approach to collect system-level provenance of domUs
that run under Xen. PASSXen’s interceptor in domU’s kernel
tracks and collects the creation, access, and destruction of
processes and files this domU. [19] proposes a network
monitoring application which identifies which process inside
a Windows domU is responsible for malicious network
traffic leaving this domU. The last work ([13]) is a demo
monitoring program in dom0 that outputs all file/directory
creation/removals happening in domU’s /root directory.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Despite its lack of trust, IaaS is a base for other types
of cloud, and is increasingly used by individuals and or-
ganizations. Accountability/monitoring, which composes of
logging systems as a core, is necessary to build trust.
However, there is not much research that discusses how to
analyze the security of such logging systems themselves
before deployment in the IaaS environment. This paper
investigates all CSA threats. It points out the importance of
accountability/monitoring, its critical logging components,
and security analysis of these components before deploy-
ment in the IaaS. We propose a generic logging template,
and describe its goals and components for the purposes of
mitigating risks associated with all CSA threats. Finally, we
provide two case studies of how to use the template for
security analysis of logging systems. The template and the
case studies can be a starting point to build and deploy
systematic logging systems in the IaaS with security or
performance concerns of the systems to truly mitigate the
risks associated with all CSA threats. This allows us to deal
with the trust issues for IaaS, which will benefit both the
customers and the providers.
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